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Full Report on NOVA results in the 2017 Cuyahoga County General Election. Effect of vote-by-mail on turnout of low income and student voters, new findings on flawed registrations, and other studies of voting in populations served by NOVA. (Summary report available at www.NOVA-Ohio.org/research)

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Research population: Between May and October 10, 2017 NOVA volunteers registered 650 voters, signed up an additional 660 voters for vote-by-mail (VBM), and obtained both VBM and registrations for 274 clients prior to the November 2017 General Election. The following report does not include data on non-Cuyahoga County applications received by NOVA volunteers nor applications without population information, nor does it include turnout data on invalid VBM applications.

Summary & discussion:

Vote-by-mail signup of registered voters by volunteers increased turnout. In the 2017 general election in Cuyahoga County, turnout of the city of Cleveland, which has generally served as a proxy for low-income voter turnout, was 23%. Turnout of voters simply registered by NOVA was in the same range. However, when NOVA volunteers signed up self-described “already registered” voters for vote-by-mail, total turnout (i.e. votes cast by mail and in-person, as a percent of all those signed up for VBM) doubled in many of the populations NOVA serves (Figure 1). This turnout-enhancing effect of VBM application was seen in some low income populations (but not at the Jobs & Family Services office), as well as in Cleveland State University students and “diverse suburban residents” of Cleveland Heights (Figure 1). A similar pattern was observed in NOVA’s voter populations in the 2016 general election², although because of the higher baseline turnout in the Presidential election, the increase due to VBM was less striking (up to 14 percentage points). Furthermore, the personal touch of volunteers appeared to make a huge difference in turnout outcome: former VBM voters signed up by NOVA in 2016, when sent a completed VBM application for 2017 (requiring only their signature) and a stamped- addressed envelope to the BOE, did not increase their turnout over those who received no mailings, whose turnout (in the 23%+/- 5% range) was similar to that of NOVA-registered or Cleveland voters (Figure 2).

¹ The data matching kindly done by Justin Alcorn, and analysis of data by NOVA Board member Nora Kancelbaum are gratefully acknowledged.

²“Lessons Learned From NOVA Volunteer Efforts to Improve Voter Registration, Vote by Mail and Turnout in 2016 (July 5, 2017).” Available at NOVA-Ohio.org/research/




Figure 1. Explanation: **1.** Locations: CSU = Cleveland State University; ODJFS = Cuyahoga County main office of Ohio Dpt. Of Jobs & Family Services; “Other low-income” = New Day in Hough, In the Neighborhood, Harbor Light Salvation Army, Harvard Community Center, etc.; “Diverse Suburban” = Zagara’s supermarket and main library in Cleveland Heights. **2.** NOVA signups: “VR Only” = clients signed up only for voter registration (including updates of address) but not for VBM; VR + VBM= clients signed up for BOTH voter registration and VBM; and “VBM only” = already registered voters who signed up for VBM. **3.** Statistics: * means that VBM result was significantly greater than VR alone or VR+VBM or “Ref.” (Reference group: the expected turnout based on the precinct turnout of the same voters (see footnote 2. for Method). In the “Other low-income” group, this result was apparent by eye but numbers were too small for statistical validation. **4.** Turnout numbers also include voters who signed up for VBM but then voted in-person. This was a small fraction of VBM voters.




Figure 2. Effect of in-person sign-up for VBM on turnout

VBM applications obtained by NOVA volunteers from many self-described “registered” voters were in fact invalid mostly because their addresses were not updated with the BOE or secondarily because they were not registered.

Either of these deficits would also have negatively affected voters' attempts to vote in-person. The percent of invalid VBM applications differed greatly between low income (15-21%), CSU students (13%), and suburban (<1%) groups. This finding demonstrates why volunteers must check the registration address and status of all voters in the groups at risk of impaired registration status. In addition, the large percentage of flawed VBM applications in the low-income groups reflects a broader community problem: extrapolation of these results (see detailed findings) leads to the estimate that at least 40,000 low income Cuyahoga County residents are currently registered with either an outdated address or are not registered at all, and yet are under the impression that their registration is valid. When attempting to vote, these voters would face possible confusion, added difficulty, and/or loss of vote. Invalid registrations could also account for many of the numerous provisional ballots cast in Cuyahoga County, which require extra poll official and BOE staff time. Further extrapolation indicates that some 132,000 low-income voters in Ohio's 6 largest counties may well have invalid registrations.

Gender-related turnout was sometimes but not always the same as had been found in the 2016 election. Increased VBM voting by women (compared to men) in 2017 was, as in 2016, found at food pantries and other low-income locations but in contrast to 2016, was not observed at CSU or ODJFS.

At the Cuyahoga County Jail, hardly any voters issued a VBM ballot used it to vote, whereas turnout of those choosing to vote in jail was 44% for both voters from Cleveland and from other cities in Cuyahoga County. The turnout of vote-at-jail voters was statistically increased compared to Cleveland residents, but the analogous results of inmates from elsewhere in Cuyahoga County (where general turnout had been 33%) were not.

Recommendations for NOVA and other registration groups, based on these findings:

- 1. Encouraging defined already-registered low-income and college student populations to vote-by-mail (VBM) resulted in substantially increased voter turnout compared to registration alone. Therefore, this should become an important focus for registration drives in these populations, provided that registrars check every voter's registration status (see next item). VBM assistance to voters after the deadline for voter registration did not increase turnout (similar to results in 2016), and might be discontinued.**
- 2. NOVA and other registration groups should initiate a "check to see that your voter registration is OK" campaign as part of their registration programs in low-income and student populations, because in 2017, 15-21% of self-stated low-income and 13% of student "registered voters" were either registered at an old address or not registered at all.**
- 3. Based on its findings and census data (See complete report for analysis) NOVA estimates that at least 40,000 low-income Cuyahoga County residents, contrary to their belief, have either not updated their voting address or are not registered at all. Thus, a campaign targeted to low-income communities (and in the long run, statewide automatic voter registration) is needed to correct these serious problems which disproportionately impede voting in low-income and student populations.**
- 4. NOVA should continue to offer registration and VBM signup to newly registering low-income voters, since it may make the difference between voting and not voting, even though the turnout is low.**
- 5. Voting in jail had a high turnout rate, and therefore inmates should be encouraged to receive their ballots in the jail. However, volunteers need to explain the possible need to vote a provisional ballot, as well as alternatives to VBM, such as early in-person voting and voting on Election Day, for inmates who believe they will be released in the near future.**
- 6. Prepopulated mailed VBM applications are not cost- and time-effective.**
- 7. The marked boost in turnout resulting from in-person encouragement to vote-by-mail, suggests that if NOVA could maintain a personal connection with its voters between elections, it might increase their turnout.**

Detailed findings:

1. At all but one location, turnout of already registered voters who were signed up for vote-by-mail by NOVA volunteers was about double that of voters who were only registered without VBM (Figure 1). This was the case at food pantries, “other low income” locations, Cleveland State University (CSU) and at two Cleveland Heights “diverse suburban” locations. The one exception to this finding was at the Ohio Jobs and Family Services main office, where neither registration alone nor VBM led to turnout over and above that expected based on the voters’ home precinct turnout (see Methods in reference cited in footnote 2). In addition, at all but one location, turnout of voters who both registered (or updated registration) and signed up for VBM was essentially the same as the low turnout of their precincts of origin. At the “diverse suburban” location, VBM and registration also appeared to increase voter turnout, but the numbers were too small for statistical validation.

Table 1: Numerical and statistical detail for Figure 1

Registration ONLY					
Group	Total #	voted	turnout	median precinct turnout	?significantly different from precinct median
CSU	136	25	18%	NA	
diverse suburban	17	6	35%	24	NS/NSN
food pantry	34	4	12%	21	NS
low income	93	17	18%	23	NS
ODJFS	55	8	15%	21	NS
Registration AND VBM					
Group	Total #	voted	turnout %	median precinct turnout	?significantly different from precinct median
CSU	57	13	23%	NA	
diverse suburban	10	5	50%	28	NSN
food pantry	26	5	19%	23	NS
low income	2	0	NS		NSN
ODJFS	48	4	8%	22	<.05 Pearson
VBM ONLY					
Group	Total #	voted	turnout %	median precinct turnout	?significantly different from precinct median
CSU	94	40	43%	NA	
diverse suburban	149	120	81%	37	<.0001
food pantry	97	44	45%	24	<.01
low income	18	9	50%	20	NSN (<.09 Pearson)
ODJFS*	133	25	19%	22	NS

(NS=not significant difference between turnout of NOVA-contacted group and that of the precincts of the same voters; NSN=not sufficient numbers to perform statistical analysis). In the case of CSU, students came from such widely varying precincts, urban and suburban, that it would have been inappropriate (NA=not applicable) to use precinct turnout as a reference.

2. NOVA VBM applications from some of its self-described “registered” voters were in fact invalid mostly because their addresses were not updated with the BOE or secondarily because they were not registered. Either of these deficits would impair or block voting. The percent of invalid VBM applications differed greatly between low income (15-21%) and CSU students (13%) vs. suburban (<1%) groups (Table 2). The large percentage of flawed VBM applications in the first two groups reveals a broader community problem which could lead to voter confusion and loss of votes. This finding demonstrates why volunteers must check the registration address and status of all voters in these groups who claim to be registered. In all groups (see Table 2), the largest cause of rejection of the VBM application was that the voter used an address on their VBM application which differed from that recorded on the BOE’s database, most likely because voters had failed to update their registrations when they moved. The next largest group of invalid applications was because voters were found not to be registered at all, possibly for the following reasons: they had “mis-remembered” registering previously, or perhaps in the past had submitted an invalid registration (e.g. no signature, nonexistent address) which they assumed to have been valid, or because they did not realize they had been purged. In a small number of cases, voter typos were the source of invalidation. In another 9 cases (not counted as errors), a registration or registration update was submitted concurrently but separately from the VBM application, so that the latter could not be tied by the BOE to the former. As discussed above, almost all of these errors could be prevented at the time of signup, if the NOVA volunteer were to go on line and check the voter’s registration address and status, and if in addition, where necessary, a new or updated registration was submitted to the BOE attached to the VBM application.

Table 2. Flawed VBM applications

Group	wrong address	not registered	good VBM applications	% VBM apps w/ wrong address or not registered
CSU	14	9	149	13%
ODJFS	37	10	180	21%
Other low income	18	6	141	15%
Suburban	0	1	158	<1%

3. Using census and income data together with the present findings that a high percentage of low income residents have flawed registrations, we estimate that at least 40,000 Cuyahoga County residents may have defective or invalid voter registration and are unaware of this problem. Using NOVA data from the 2016 General Election (Table 3), the mean of individual voters’ median Household income +/- standard deviation (which would include 68% of this population), was determined, based on voter address³, for voters contacted at ODJFS, Food Pantry, and the Windemere RTA Station and Salvation Army. The span of incomes from the lowest mean minus standard deviation to the highest mean plus standard deviation (Table 3) was \$19,000 to \$61,000, which comprises 39% of the County’s population (based on the 2015 distribution of

³ Supplied by means of geocoding by Mark Salling, Director of the Northern Ohio Data and Information Service at the Levin College of Cleveland State University.

household income⁴). If there are 986,988 adults (18 and older according to census data) in Cuyahoga County, 39% is $0.39 \times 986,988 = 384,925$ adults in this range of incomes. If 70% in this income range are registered⁵, this comes to 269,448 voters. Finally, if even 15% of these voters have flawed registration status (Table 2), then $0.15 \times 269,448 = 40,417$ voters are at risk of difficulty or impossibility of voting. This is a highly conservative estimate because: 1. If one averaged the observed range (Table 2) of 15-21% flawed registrations in Table 2 to an average risk of 18%, the number of low-income voters at risk would grow to $0.18 \times 269,448 = 48,501$; and 2) If one included the 23% of adults in households with <\$20,000 income and 60% registration rate and 15% flawed registration status, this would add another 20,000 individuals at risk.

Table 3. Mean and standard deviation data from the 2016 General Election, in which a household income was assigned to every voter serviced by NOVA, based on the voter’s address and census block information on household income.

Location	Registration			VBM		
	No. voters	Mean Household Income	Std. Deviation	No. voters	Mean Household Income	Std. Deviation
ODJFS	433	\$38,857	\$17,156	388	\$36,469	\$16,051
Food Pantry	446	\$34,537	\$15,360	414	\$46,373	\$15,048
RTA Windemere + Salvation Army	98	\$40,167	\$15,579	94	\$38,028	\$16,087

Other analyses confirm that poverty is strongly related to impaired registration. For instance, an analysis of the percent of 2017 VBM applications with wrong address, different last name, or non-existent registration⁶, showed that the error rate in VBM applications from Cuyahoga County cities with median household income less than \$40,000 was 0.92% whereas in cities with median income greater than \$40,000 it was 0.23%. In the former group, the city of Cleveland was an outlier with a 3.2% error rate, whereas in the latter group, Cleveland Heights (the “suburban” group in this report) had a 0.6% error rate. **These rates do not reflect the actual incidence of registration flaws in the general population, because they are based on VBM applications from highly motivated voters:** in 2017, the Secretary of State did not send voters application forms, so that those who did apply had to exert extra effort, and are less likely to submit defective registrations. In addition, an analysis of city household income in Cuyahoga County vs. the fraction of registered voters in those cities who applied for VBM (Figure 3), shows that residents of lower income cities use VBM about half as much as upper income cities, so that applications coming from lower income cities are even more likely to be those of a motivated selected population. **It is extremely important to understand why NOVA’s low income/ODJFS percentage of flawed VBM applications (wrong address, not registered per Table 2) is so much higher than that based only on an analysis of Board of Elections data.** The former comes from a population in which unselected citizens frequenting low income areas were asked about their registration status, so that the sample is more or less random (barring those citizens who chose not to respond at all): the BOE data, however, as already mentioned, comes from motivated, probably relatively wealthier, individuals who took the initiative to obtain and file a VBM application. Therefore it is no surprise that the error rate in city-wide VBM applications to the BOE, even as high as Cleveland’s 3.2% of VBM applications is way below that of NOVA’s ODJFS/low income population (15%/21%).

Indeed, NOVA’s observed error rates are consonant with a Pew Center finding⁷ that nationwide one in eight voter registrations is “no longer valid or ...significantly inaccurate”. Also, the marked relation of lower income to likelihood of flawed registration, as reported here, in part reflects the higher rate of moving in low income populations⁸, which increases the need for more frequent registration updates. And still further corroboration comes from the Cuyahoga Board of Elections, which informed NOVA that in

⁴ See chart of Household income distribution at https://datausa.io/profile/geo/cuyahoga-county-oh/#category_income

⁵ Table 7, Nov. 2016 election <https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html>

⁶ Data on numbers of VBM applications and errors by city were supplied by the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections. The comparison excludes cities in the County with under 3,000 registered voters, in order to avoid aberrant small-number results on ratios. The included cities comprised about 97% of all registered voters in Cuyahoga County.

⁷“Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade” at: http://www.pewtrusts.org/~media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewupgradingvoterregistrationpdf.pdf

⁸ E.g. U.S. Census Data on Geographical Mobility, 2016 to 2017, Table 1, Midwest, shows 20% mobility in 1+ years for those living at <100% poverty, vs. 14% at between 100% and 150% poverty, and 10% for those >150% poverty.

<https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/geographic-mobility/cps-2017.html>

April and May 2013, 12% of all registrations sent to the Board by the Cuyahoga ODJFS had errors rendering them invalid for registration purposes.




Figure 3. Fraction of registered voters applying for VBM as a function of city household income

Another check on whether the estimate of 40,000 Cuyahoga County residents are indeed unaware that their registration was “flawed” (i.e. they were not registered or registered at a former address) is based on the usage of provisional ballots in the high turnout 2016 Presidential election. In NOVA’s lower-income groups, 2016 turnout was 58-59%¹⁰, and so $.59 \times 40,000 = 23,600$ of these voters might have experienced difficulties voting. Many of these voters, being told they were not registered or at the wrong polling place, would have given up their attempt to file a probably unsuccessful provisional ballot, or because of childcare or work obligations, might not have had time to commute to the correct polling location. Thus, the calculated number of people with flawed registration status (23,600) would be greater than the observed number (19,396) of those who actually cast provisional ballots in 2016 (the majority of which were probably filed because of address updates). In other words, the estimate of 40,000 Cuyahoga residents with flawed registration status is consistent with the actual number of provisional ballots cast in 2016.

Urban poverty exists in many Ohio counties besides Cuyahoga. To get a crude estimate of how many Ohio-wide low-income adults might have flawed registration status, the number of low-income adults in poverty for Ohio’s 6 largest counties was determined from 2016 census data¹¹ and used to derive the estimate that **some 132,000 voters in Ohio’s 6 largest counties may have a flawed registration status**⁸. Even if this highly extrapolated number were off target by say 30%, that would still leave some 90,000 individuals at risk of voter confusion or loss of vote.

⁹ Personal communication from Registration Dept. of Cuyahoga BOE, based on 1484 submitted ODJFS registration forms, of which 12% had missing address, missing signature, or were unreadable. Note that by law, ODJFS must submit to the BOE all registrations provided by their clients, even if they have obvious errors.

¹⁰ See Research Report, “[Lessons Learned From NOVA Volunteer Efforts to Improve Voter Registration, Vote by Mail and Turnout in 2016](http://www.NOVA-Ohio.org)” at www.NOVA-Ohio.org

¹¹ Found on line at U.S. Census Bureau Quickfacts. (e.g. for [Cuyahoga County](http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/cuyahoga-county-ohio)). The 6 largest counties were Franklin, Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Lucas, Summit and Montgomery. For each county, the population was multiplied by the fraction of those over 18 years old multiplied by the percent in poverty to obtain the number of adults in poverty. The total for all 6 counties, 579360, was divided by the number for Cuyahoga County, 177,658, to obtain a ratio of all 6 counties to Cuyahoga County of 3.3. The 40,000 low-income individuals with registration flaws in Cuyahoga County was multiplied by 3.3 to estimate how many individuals would be in the same status in all of the 6 largest counties. The product was 132,000.

4. At some locations, gender was related to turnout with VBM: there was greater turnout by female voters at food pantries and “other” low-income locations (as in 2016), but in contrast to 2016, there was equal turnout of males and females at CSU and low turnout by female voters at ODJFS (Table 4).

Table 4. Gender and turnout of VBM applications in 2017 vs. 2016

Subgroup	Gender	total	# Issued VBM ballot	# Returned VBM ballot	Turnout 2017	Turnout 2016
CSU	F	83	83	25	30%	90%
	M	66	66	21	32%	71%
Suburban	F	104	104	74	71%	NA
	M	54	54	40	74%	NA
Food Pantry	F	83	82	34	41%	65%
	M	37	37	6	16%	NA
Low Income Group	F	11	11	5	45%	NA
	M	11	11	3	27%	NA
ODJFS	F	135	134	13	10%	76%
	M	46	45	13	29%	61%

5. At the Cuyahoga County Jail, hardly any voters who were issued a VBM ballot used it to vote. In contrast, turnout of those choosing to vote in jail was 44% both for Cleveland residents and for those from other cities in Cuyahoga County. From publicly available court information, it appears that about half of the inmates who requested VBM ballots did not vote because: they were still in jail on election day, lost their eligibility to vote because they were later sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony, or if released may have been at a different address. Thus, the use of the word “turnout” is not entirely appropriate, but in any case the response to VBM ballots was minimal (Table 5). In contrast, inmates who requested ballots to be sent to the jail (Table 5) had a relatively high turnout (using the voters’ home city rather than precinct as the reference).

Table 5. Voter turnout at the Cuyahoga County jail

	# issued	# voted	“turnout”*	City turnout	statistical significance
Jail VBM - City of Cleveland only**	79	1	1%	NA	NA
Jail VBM – Cuy. County EXCEPT Cleveland**	50	1	2%	NA	NA
Vote-At-Jail - City of Cleveland only	107	47	44%	23%	<.001
Vote-At-Jail - Cuy. County cities EXCEPT Cleveland	50	22	44%	33%	NS

*See text above for explanation of why “turnout” is in quotes for VBM voters. NA (not applicable) is used because of all the extenuating circumstances that decreased response to mailed VBM ballots. ** The given numbers include a small number of cases (<4% of the total) where jail residents were both registered to vote and signed up for VBM.

6. Sending pre-populated VBM applications in 2017 to NOVA VBM voters from 2016 did not increase turnout compared to that of other 2016 VBM voters not sent a VBM application. Food pantry clients who did not receive mailed VBM applications appeared to “compensate” by increasing voting at the polls.

Voters from CSU, ODJFS, and Food Pantry, whom NOVA had signed up for VBM in 2016 and had then voted, were divided into two groups of identical size (Table 6). One of the two groups was sent: a cover letter explaining the importance of voting, a “pre-populated” VBM application form containing all the voter’s required information except signature and date, and a stamped return envelope addressed to the Board of Elections. The other of the two groups received no mailing from NOVA, but both groups separately received a mailing from the Board of Elections in which VBM was promoted and instructions were given on how to apply.

None of the mailings to these clients yielded a significant increase in total turnout (sum of VBM and at the polls) compared to that of their precincts (Table 6). Although the numbers are small, it appeared that Food Pantry clients did use the mailed applications, but those that did not receive the mailing “compensated” by increasing their use of voting at the polls.

Table 6. Results of pilot study to see if sending populated VBM application to previous years’ VBM voters would increase turnout

Voters received populated VBM application in the mail + stamp-addressed envelope to BOE							
location	#Nova sent mailing	undeliverable	# received	# VBM issued	# VBM returned	# voted at the polls	turnout (VBM + at polls)
CSU	39	1	38	5	4	3	18%
ODJFS	47	4	43	5	2	3	12%
Food Pantry	69	5	64	24	12	4	25%
Voters did not receive mailed VBM application							
location	# Nova used as controls			# VBM issued	# VBM returned	# voted at the polls	turnout (VBM + at polls)
CSU	39			4	1	2	8%
ODJFS	47			2	2	4	13%
Food Pantry	69			9	4	10	20%

In-person VBM applications resulting from contact with NOVA volunteers (Figure 2) yielded far higher turnout than either VBM applications mailed to 2016 VBM voters, or 2016 VBM voters who were not mailed 2017 applications (Table 6). The turnout of 3 comparable groups of already registered voters (presented above in topics 1 and 6) showed remarkable differences. The first group (identical to the “VBM only” group in Fig.1 and Table 1) were voters who told NOVA volunteers they were already registered, and then completed VBM applications which the volunteers checked and submitted to the BOE. The second and third groups were selected from NOVA files of those who voted by mail in the 2016 election. As described above, the second group received a prepopulated VBM application and stamped-addressed envelope to send to the BOE after the application was signed. The 3rd group received no mailing from NOVA. In general, the low turnout of the second and third groups was about the same as the precinct vote (see Figure 1). In contrast, at

CSU and Food Pantries but not at ODJFS, the turnout of the first group (contacted personally by NOVA volunteers) was about double that of the second or third group, or about double the precinct turnout. These results were statistically significant (Table 7). In other words, personal contact with NOVA volunteers plus the checking of the VBM application made a large difference in voter turnout in an election with very low general turnout.

Table 7. 2017 Turnout and statistical tests comparing in-person VBM application to mailed or non-contacted voters

	#	Turnout, in-person VBM	statistica l signif.	#	Turnout, mailed VBM to 2016 VBM voter	statistica l signif.	#	Turnout, no mailing to 2016 VBM voter
CSU	94	43%	<.01	38	18%	<.001	39	8%
ODJFS	133	19%	NS	43	12%	NS	47	13%
Food Pantry	102	45%	<.01	64	25%	<.01	69	20%

7. VBM Turnout at ODJFS was greater when voters were signed up before rather than after Oct. 10, 2017, the deadline for registration, even though the venue before Oct. 10 was an outside landing, and after Oct. 10 was in the waiting room (Table 8).

Comparing the total turnout (VBM + in-person votes as percent of VBM applications), there was a statistically significant ($p < .03$) greater turnout for VBM applications issued up to Oct. 10 (to ODJFS clients) than for applications issued afterwards. The most probable explanation for this result has nothing to do with whether VBM's were applied for in the waiting room or outside, but rather to the earlier date of application. A very similar result was noted in analysis of the ODJFS turnout in the 2016 general election², where using numbers provided in that report, total turnout was 72% for applications before Oct. 10 and 55% (similar to reference percentage) for those afterwards. In other words, the timing of the application appears to be the key factor in the resulting turnout. A possible reason for this finding is that ODJFS clients, with more socioeconomic issues, may need more time (than the interval between Oct. 10 and election day) to get around to completing their ballots.

Table 8. Total turnout (VBM + in-person votes) of ODJFS clients signed up by NOVA for VBM either before or after Oct. 10.

ballots issued		#voted	# in group	Turnout	statistical significance between these two groups
from	to				
28-Sep	10-Oct	21	84	25%	P<0.03
11-Oct	2-Nov	4	49	8%	